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Introduction 
 
The BBC requires its journalists to ‘report acts of terror quickly, accurately, fully and 
responsibly’ (BBC, 2012: 1) yet the Corporation’s flagship current affairs series Panorama’s 
investigation of the 11 September atrocities and the ensuing ‘War on Terror’ was narrow, 
factually-flawed and served to amplify hawkish policy prescriptions that ultimately led to 
ruinous wars against Afghanistan and Iraq.  Evidence for this view emerges through an 
examination of four major investigations into Al-Qaeda and the events of 9-11 broadcast 
between September 2001 and July 2002.  Study of these key episodes shows how 
Panorama’s coverage lacked investigative depth and drew unfounded links between the 9-11 
leader Mohamed Atta and Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, whilst contributing to an 
information vacuum around the attacks that helped feed far-fetched conspiracy theories that 
sprang up in their aftermath. 
 
 
Other Panorama episodes dealt with the broad subject of terrorism and ‘the War on Terror’ 
within this period, including three studio debates (‘Britain on the Brink’; ‘War on Terrorism’ 
and ‘Clash of Cultures’) which have been written about elsewhere (see Cottle, 2002). The 
focus here, however, is on the quality of the investigative reports that dealt with the traumatic 
events of September 2001 and their aftermath, events which led to a profound shift in US 
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foreign and security policy, with far-reaching consequences for Britain and the rest of the 
world (see Norris, Kern and Just, 2003; Moeller, 2004).  
 
 
Context for the Investigations: the Events of 11 September 
 
On the morning of 11 September 2001,  nineteen militants associated with the Islamic 
extremist group Al-Qaeda hijacked four American airliners armed with nothing more 
sophisticated than Stanley knives. These hijackings and the attacks on the World Trade 
Centre and the Pentagon led to around three thousand deaths, billions of dollars in destruction 
and triggered unprecedented military, economic and political developments both in America 
and around the globe.  
In less than two hours the United States had been transformed physically and psychologically 
by the biggest peacetime attack on the American mainland in the country’s history. The 
image of the second passenger jet penetrating the south tower and the collapse of the two 
tallest buildings in New York was played on televisions around the world in heavy rotation 
(up to 30 times per hour). Yet destruction on this scale was difficult to fully comprehend, 
except perhaps in relation to many Hollywood disaster movies. Slavoj Zizek (2002) 
compared the ‘theatrical spectacle’ of the attacks to high budget disaster scenes familiar from 
Hollywood films arguing that: 
For the large majority of the public, the World Trade Centre explosions were 
events on the TV screen, and when we watched the oft-repeated shot of 
frightened people running towards the camera ahead of the giant cloud of dust 
from the collapsing tower, was the framing of the shot itself not reminiscent of 
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the spectacular shots in catastrophe movies, a special effect which outdid all 
others […]? (Zizek 2002: 11) 
 
Zizek was one of many commentators to note that Hollywood had fantasised such destruction 
countless times. Other writers and media pundits noted grotesque ‘intertextual’ similarities 
with films such as Independence Day, Escape from New York, Armageddon and a host of 
disaster movies (see discussion below of Panorama’s ‘September 11th: A Warning From 
Hollywood’ ). In the days that followed images of the second passenger jet penetrating the 
south tower, the spectacular collapse of the twin towers and the extensive damage to the 
Pentagon were played repeatedly on British television screens, as rolling news broadcasts on 
a number of channels pieced together events and suggested various explanations. Bin Laden 
and the Al-Qaeda network were strongly suspected and terrorist experts were called in to give 
background and provide possible explanations – explanations that became more credible as 
the huge investigation quickly uncovered the names of the nineteen hijackers. For the 
relatively well-resourced BBC current affairs series Panorama, an opportunity presented 
itself to investigate and provide context to the attacks in ways which news was not capable of 
doing. As Cottle notes of the current affairs form: 
 
 
Of all TV genres, current affairs programming has traditionally been charged with 
going behind the imagery and event-orientation of TV news. Because of its 
longer production gestation, it can provide a temporally longer view and deeper 
contextualisation of the events in question […] 
(Cottle, 2002: 179) 
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However, Panorama’s initial response to the attacks in the US quickly became the subject of 
some controversy. Various press accounts indicate unhappiness by veteran reporter Tom 
Mangold about his Editor Mike Robinson’salleged instructions not to cover the story 
immediately (Mangold was within an hour’s drive of New York at the time). It has been 
claimed that Mangold was ordered to fly back to the UK while BBC journalists were flown 
out to the US on a specially chartered plane, only to be grounded for several days in Canada 
amidst the massive security clampdown (Cran, 2002; Lindley, 2003). A major difficulty with 
researching Panorama’s coverage of 9-11 has been the reluctance of many journalists and 
producers to go on the record or be interviewed at all about behind-the-scenes events. This 
author’s off-the-record discussions with a person who was in the BBC’s newsroom at the 
time of the attacks confirms press accounts of why there was no immediate Panorama 
coverage  and suggests there was disagreement between the Head of Current Affairs, Peter 
Horrocks, and Robinson in terms of what they saw the role of Panorama to be: 
 
Horrocks wanted the Panorama team to do a fast turnaround for that evening’s 
news programmes to record what was happening [while] Mike wanted to do a 
more thoughtful programme after the event, instead of on the evening of the 
event.  So basically he wouldn’t give over anybody to work on it, so other people 
in current affairs went off and did this ‘Special’.  What happened then, there was 
a war between Mangold and Corbin, because Mangold usually dealt with the CIA 
and DEA in the States, that was all his baby, [..] and Jane [Corbin] usually did, or 
had done, Middle East stuff on Bin Laden. 
(to author, 2007) 
Corbin, according to this source, reportedly told Robinson, ‘That’s my gig. I don’t care where 
Mangold is.’  So, despite Tom Mangold being within a short drive of New York and having 
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good US intelligence contacts, Robinson used Corbin on the programme with a promise that 
Mangold would be given an opportunity to report on events at a later date. 
 
The World’s Most Wanted 
 
Consequently, as a result of this alleged ‘compromise’ the first Panorama that covered the 9-
11 attacks was ‘The World’s Most Wanted’ transmitted five days later on 16 September, 
which was presented by Jane Corbin. Corbin’s polished and informative report, which 
represented a major improvement on much of the highly repetitive news coverage, is 
structured by interleaving an account of Bin Laden’s life and career as a ‘terrorist 
mastermind’, using footage from her previous investigations going back to 1998 with new 
images of the attacks on the World Trade Centre and interviews with survivors. The opening 
shot, played over Corbin’s voiceover (below), is stock aerial film of the Twin Towers which 
cuts to a rapidly edited sequence of shots of the passenger jet crashing into the south tower 
filmed from different angles. This is followed by news footage of President Bush: 
 
JANE CORBIN:  It stood proud on the New York skyline, a symbol of the 
American dream.  On Tuesday it was shattered.  Within hours suspicion fell on 
one man. 
 
PRESIDENT BUSH:  There is no question he is what we would call a prime 
suspect. 
 
CORBIN:  The prime suspect is Osama Bin Laden whose murderous campaign 
against America had already earned him a place on the FBI's most wanted list. 
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The camera pulls out from a grainy black and white still image of Osama’s face on an FBI 
‘most wanted’ notice (echoing the title of the programme). The crude black and white 
photocopy closely resembles a wanted poster from a western - a stereotypical American 
image perhaps deliberately selected to accompany the blunt message delivered in George W. 
Bush’s Texan drawl: 
 
BUSH:  And if he thinks he can hide and run from the United States or allies, he 
will be sorely mistaken.   
 
Corbin’s concluding line to the introduction plays over a close up of a colour photographic 
portrait of Bin Laden which zooms in to an extreme close up of his eyes: 
 
CORBIN:  Tonight Panorama investigates the terrorist, Osama Bin Laden, the 
world's most wanted man.  
 
Significantly, Corbin departs here from the BBC’s editorial guidelines to avoid the term 
‘terrorist’ (BBC 2012) a label which she employs five more times in the programme to refer 
to Osama Bin Laden and his associates. While this designation would seem to be 
uncontroversial given Bin Laden’s later praise for the crimes against humanity of 11 
September, it does, nevertheless, threaten to compromise the BBC’s ability to report 
‘impartially’. As Moeller notes:  
 
After September 11, it was a short step for many media to first source the terms 
of the ‘war on terror’ and ‘terrorist’ to the president and other administration 
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officials, then as the term slipped into common usage to begin applying the terms 
to the Bush foreign policy goals without attribution. 
(2004: 69) 
 
The use of the term ‘terrorist’, (rather than, say, ‘criminal’) is not in itself remarkable given 
the scale of civilian casualties on 11 September. Nevertheless, its use sets a precedent and 
establishes a frame of reporting that is not easily relinquished and is also congruent with 
more hawkish prescriptions of how the international community should respond to the events. 
Similarly, dramatic visual devices punctuating the narrative emphasize Bin Laden’s sinister 
and all-powerful role. In one sequence the camera pans slowly across a pile of studio-lit 
concrete rubble beneath which a television broadcasts a slow motion sequence of Bin Laden 
addressing the camera. While the shot is an effectively disorientating and powerful visual 
statement its constructed nature raises awkward questions about the extent to which current 
affairs programmes should contrive such images. Do such interventions add anything to our 
knowledge of the attacks or could the time spent filming them have been better spent? 
 
The report’s main focus of inquiry implicating Bin Laden in the 9-11 attacks and pointing to 
a looming US strike against Al-Qaida bases in Afghanistan was in line with much of the 
mainstream news reporting. By framing the story in terms of a war against the fanatics who 
had committed such a crime, other questions remained unanswered or even unasked. What 
were the origins of Al-Qaida and why were they at war with America? What were the 
business links between the Bin Laden and Bush family and how was Osama Bin Laden 
connected to the CIA? How had such a colossal failure of intelligence and breach of security 
occurred on 11 September? It transpired that the US government had received repeated 
warnings of impending attacks on Washington and New York from a number of countries. 
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American intelligence had also been made aware since 1995 that planes might be used in 
suicide attacks following threats to the Atlanta Olympics in 1996, the CIA headquarters in 
Langley, Virginia and the Pentagon (Washington Post, 23/9/01), yet urgent recommendations 
to improve security of airports in the US and particularly flight cockpits had been repeatedly 
ignored (Ridgeway, 2010). 
In fact, Panorama’s first investigation of the attacks ‘The World’s Most Wanted’ does deal 
with some of these issues, albeit rather briefly. Using interview material and footage 
assembled for a 1998 report Corbin looks at Bin Laden’s formative experiences in the US-
backed war against the Soviets in Afghanistan and how the 1991 Gulf War had been a turning 
point in his attitude to America. Over shots of praying Muslims in Mecca and US tanks in the 
Saudi desert Corbin explains: 
CORBIN:  Osama Bin Laden's view of America hardened into hatred when the 
Gulf War brought US troops into Saudi Arabia in 1991.  Bin Laden was now 
living back in Saudi.  His homeland was the site of Islam's holy places.  Angry 
already at America's support of Israel, Bin Laden's fury boiled over at what he 
saw as occupation by the infidel.   
 
 
After tracing Bin Laden’s involvement in the previous bombing of the World Trade Centre 
Corbin’s report also suggests, revealingly, that US intelligence agencies had been aware for 
years of the possibility of an Al-Qaida attack using passenger aircraft: 
 
CORBIN:  A year after the World Trade Centre attack, the full scale of the wider 
terror campaign was revealed, and another member of the network was arrested in 
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the Philippines.  Abdul Hakim Murad was a trained pilot and his confession to the 
local intelligence services reveals the gang had planned to blow up 11 US 
airliners in midair, and Murad had discussed with [1993 World Trade Centre 
bomber Ramsey] Yousef the possibility of crashing a plane into an American 
Government building. 
 
(Voiceover reading from typed document:) "He will board any American 
commercial aircraft pretending to be an ordinary passenger.  He will hijack said 
aircraft, control its cockpit and dive it at the CIA headquarters.  It is simply a 
suicidal mission that he is willing to execute." 
 
Rather than ask why the government had not forced airlines to reinforce their cockpit doors 
against such attacks as repeatedly recommended in security reviews, the report cuts back 
again to the spectacle of the south tower being hit  before moving on to the gruesome 
testimony of an eyewitness: 
 
NEW YORK CITY 
09.03 Hijackers crash second plane 
 
MIKE McMAHON (Paramedic) 
[...] just before that plane hit the building there was a deafening silence.  It was 
like a split second of quiet and then the explosion.  We're basically under the 
building so stuff is raining down on us.  At first we thought it was parts of the 
building but it was people, literally people falling all around us.  Like I said, you 
can't imagine what it was like. 
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The visceral terror of the 9-11 attacks are returned to after each exposé of Bin Laden’s past 
crimes, including a sequence on the 1998 bombings of the American Embassies in Nairobi 
and Dar es Salaam. Following the  revelation of his involvement in earlier atrocities the 
episode returns to more film of the collapsing towers not previous seen in news reports. The 
spectacular nature of these shots in reinforced by the eyewitness testimony: 
 
NEW YORK CITY 
10.29  North tower collapses 
(footage of collapse - huge, dense plume of smoke billows up and outward, and 
continues relentlessly rolling outward, overtaking and enveloping people as they 
flee the scene) 
 
MIKE McMAHON (Paramedic) 
It's just like you take the scariest movie you could ever think of.  You look at 
these Die Hard movies... and silly movies, it's just unimaginable, unimaginable.   
 
This theme of the nightmarish, cinematic quality of 9-11 is picked up some months later in 
Panorama’s ‘September 11th: A Warning From Hollywood’ and is discussed below. What 
emerges from a study of ‘The World’s Most Wanted’ is a sense of how structuring the 
investigation in this dramatic and, it should be said, highly effective manner (intercutting 
from previous investigations to scenes from the attack) cuts off important lines of inquiry at 
vital moments. Issues not explored elsewhere in the news are opened only to be closed again 
as the film returns to the dreadful spectacle of 9-11 and tales of individual heroism and 
tragedy. 
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It is significant that the possible ‘culpability’ of the US government in allowing the 9-11 
attacks was the subject of much (detailed, if sometimes wild) speculation in several books 
and on hundreds of websites, but almost never on television. The question of how to prevent 
future attacks was also limited to one of ‘winning a war’ - a government policy that was 
unquestioned from the start. The possibility of using legal means to bring the terrorists behind 
the attack to trial, as had happened with the bombing of the FBI building in Oklahoma, is not 
discussed in any of the Panorama episodes examined here. This despite unanimous 
international agreement that the attacks were ‘a crime against humanity’ and universal 
readiness to use the UN and bodies such as the International Court of Human Justice to bring 
the perpetrators to justice and take effective co-ordinated action to prevent further outrages. 
The US’s unwillingness to recognize the jurisdiction of the International Court of Human 
Justice and its disdain for multilateral co-operation on a whole range of issues may account, 
in part, for its reluctance to follow this route. Nevertheless, Panorama’s decision not to 
explore or consider this option in line with mainstream British and American media coverage 
of the US response to 9-11.an omission with grave consequences for the democratic debate 
about how best to respond to the attacks.  
There was virtually no broadcast discussion of alternative agendas to those suggested by the 
US government and secret services (Kellner, 2003). Yet these very agencies had spent four 
billion dollars in ‘Operation Cyclone’ helping arm and train Bin Laden and other Muslim 
fundamentalists in the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan (see Holmes and Dixon, 
2001). For some commentators, such as John Pilger (2002), the CIA - through intermediaries 
in the Pakistani Secret Service (ISI) and with the financial backing of Saudi Arabia had 
effectively created the Islamist war party that attacked America.  
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Reporting the Anthrax Attacks 
While Jane Corbin’s first report raises some concerns about how far a ‘flagship’ current 
affairs series could go in answering serious questions about the 9-11 attacks, Tom Mangold’s 
report on the anthrax attacks of September and October 2001 raises far more serious and 
troubling questions about Panorama’s reliance on intelligence sources. A key aspect of the 
framing of what came to be known as the ‘War on Terror’ was the use of fear (see Mythen 
and Walklate, 2006; Oborne, 2006). This was evident from the Panorama report ‘Bin 
Laden’s Biological Threat’  which made a link between the Iraq regime and Al-Qaeda 
operatives, a link later shown to be completely false and possibly a result of deliberate 
‘misinformation’. Immediately following the ten second Panorama signature tune and 
revolving globe graphic, Tom Mangold’s voice-over sets the scene against low synthesiser 
notes and an eerie high-pitched electronic warble familiar from the horror film genre: 
 
TOM MANGOLD:  The fear is as old as history.  The plague doctor of the 
Middle Ages helpless in the continent where disease killed millions.  Today the 
images have returned and with them the fear that disease may walk the land once 
more. 
 
This chilling introduction is accompanied by black-and-white library footage of viruses 
attacking a cell under a microscope and half-lit studio shots of a man in a leather Medieval 
plague doctor’s mask. This cuts quickly to a close-up of the eyes of the mask lit so that they 
appear empty, which then cuts to an identically-framed close-up and then medium-shot of a 
man in contemporary biological warfare suit.  The low, insistent synthesiser notes continue as 
the images dissolve to sheer white. From white there is another dissolve to the image of a 
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screen in a mocked-up laboratory on which television footage of Tony Blair giving a speech 
to Parliament is projected - with the subtitle ‘14th September 2001’: 
 
TONY BLAIR:  [Speaking in the House] We know that they would, if they could, 
go further and use chemical, biological or even nuclear weapons of mass 
destruction.  We know also that there are groups or people, occasionally states, 
who will trade the technology and capability of such weapons. 
 
During this speech the camera cuts from the screen framed by artfully-lit test tubes to a close 
up of Tony Blair’s face before cutting to another establishing shot of the screen and lab. The 
camera tilts down towards an underlit glass laboratory preparation area on which more test 
tubes, beakers of blue and yellow liquids and other chemistry paraphernalia is arranged and 
against which rests the same colour photograph of Osama Bin Laden used in the introduction 
to ‘The World’s Most Wanted’. The voice-over during this sequence offers the possibility 
that such frightening images will be exposed as government ‘scare-mongering’: 
 
MANGOLD:  Could there really be a biological attack by Al-Qaeda terrorists and 
are we ready for it if there is?  Tonight Panorama sorts facts from fears and 
investigates the reality behind six weeks that have shaken the world. 
 
In John Corner’s typography of documentary discourse, the opening shots described above 
could be characterised as in an ‘associative mode’ as the ‘pro-filmic’ shot types and editing 
rely on a set of horror and science-thriller (cf. The Satan Bug 1965; The Andromeda Strain 
1971; Outbreak 1995) generic conventions and clichés. As Corner notes, such image 
references ‘may be primarily aesthetic rather than cognitive’ aiming to produce an effect on 
 14 
the audience and not necessarily ‘increased informational yield’ (1996: 29). After this 
attention-grabbing introduction the programme switches into a less ‘pro-filmic’ ‘illustrative 
mode’ employing a series of clips from recent news footage to accompany the emerging 
argument. It starts with a medium shot of George Bush answering journalists’ questions, 
before moving to rapidly-cut images of postal workers in face masks and investigators 
removing sacks of post from US government buildings in biological-weapons suits and 
spraying each other to remove possible anthrax contamination: 
 
24 October 2001 
GEORGE BUSH:  First of all I don't have anthrax. 
 
MANGOLD:  The man in the White House may have escaped but three people 
have been murdered by proxy, another ten infected and thirty-two more exposed.  
Letters laced with anthrax have closed Congress and sent the US mail service into 
chaos.  The perpetrators remain free.  No link has been established to Bin Laden 
but there is growing evidence in the West of his involvement in the new horror of 
biological terrorism. 
 
Before we come to the charges made against Iraq in the programme, what subsequently 
emerged as the background to the events portrayed in these clips is worth dwelling on here as 
it reveals important omissions never addressed in subsequent Panorama investigations into 
WMD. Not mentioned in Mangold’s report is that the attacks began only one week after 11 
September with anthrax letters mailed to the NBC television network and New York Post, but 
which were not reported until more than two weeks after they were opened (see Rosenberg, 
2002).  It was, according to Rosenberg’s account, a further week after the death of the first 
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victim before reports on NBC and elsewhere acknowledged that letters had been received by 
media organisations containing anthrax spores and threats of more attacks. By this time more 
deadly letters had already been posted to Democrat Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle and 
Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy (New York Times, 2009). From the 
middle of October to the end of November four or five letters bearing the same handwriting 
and containing lethal, ‘weaponised’ anthrax were sent, resulting in eighteen cases of infection 
and five deaths. Thirty-three thousand Americans were administered anthrax vaccines or 
other drugs (Kasuya et al. 2005), many of which had severe side effects and the postal service 
was forced to spend billions of dollars to protect their workers from possible attacks 
(Baltimore Sun, 2002). 
 
However, almost as soon as it became clear that the anthrax had originated in an American 
US germ warfare laboratory (see New York Times, 2009), media interest in the case appeared 
to ‘fizzle out’ (see Monbiot, 2002). Television networks and newspapers that had been direct 
victims of the attacks seemed unperturbed two months later that those responsible for the 
deaths of five people, an assassination attempt on the leadership of the Democratic party and 
the temporary shut down of parts of the US government and postal services were still at large. 
No suspects were ever apprehended and put on trial, as Mangold notes, and yet neither 
Panorama nor any other British or US teams of investigative reporters looked at the bungled 
FBI investigation or the possibility that the same killers might strike again. It seems the 
media were unwilling to follow the trail of the killer into what Tom Engelhardt describes as 
‘the darkest heartlands of US bioweapons research, and so into the heart of Cold War military 
R&D from which so much has emerged to endanger our world’ (Engelhardt, 2002: 1). 
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Later in ‘Bin Laden’s Biological Threat’ evidence is brought forward of meetings between 
the 9-11 plotter and Iraqi officials that has subsequently been denied by the CIA and 
thoroughly discredited, but in 2001 it is presented in the report as fact. Sitting at Prague 
airport Tom Mangold addresses the camera in ‘evidential mode’ (see Corner 1996) sitting in 
the location the 9-11 plotter and an Iraqi intelligence officer are supposed to have met: 
 
MANGOLD:  […]  The reason we know the terrorist and the Iraqi spy met here at 
Prague Airport on at least one occasion is because they were photographed 
together by the  Czech Security Services on the day that Atta flew to the United 
States.  But what was Mohamed Atta plotting, and why did he have to come so 
far out of his way just to meet the man who was Saddam Hussein's station chief 
in Prague? 
 
JIM WOOLSEY 
Director, CIA, 1993-95 
It looks extremely suspicious and I doubt very seriously if Mr Atta was in that 
lovely city of Prague as a tourist and just happened to chance upon an Iraqi 
intelligence officer as his tour guide on two occasions, and I also, I rather doubt 
that his interest in crop-dusting was at that point because he was interested in a 
second career.  He knew he had no second career.  Those are both extremely 
suspicious acts on his part. 
 
Mangold has admitted that the information about the meeting was supplied by a single 
(named) source from Czech intelligence but that reports of the supposedly photographed 
meeting could not be corroborated further at the time. In our interview Mangold describes the 
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information given by his source as ‘totally untrue’. Queried if he knew it was untrue, he 
replies, ‘Yes, I was totally lied to’. It was then put to Mangold that: ‘If it was a lie, that 
suggests it was disinformation’ to which he answers, ‘Yes, it was.’ When asked why Czech 
intelligence was feeding false information to him, he replies: ‘I have no idea what the broader 
plan there was, but it was complete… [pause] …it was all bollocks. Complete nonsense’ 
(interviewed 4 September 2009). Former CIA director Jim Woolsey’s carefully worded 
assessment of this information for the Panorama episode suggests American intelligence 
endorsement and possible involvement in ‘planting’ the story, but Mangold was unwilling to 
speculate in this area(‘It was some time ago and I can’t remember’) and so without further 
evidence the precise background to this investigation remains unclear. The episode is a 
reminder of allegations made against the British and American governments by Scott Ritter 
and others of a long running deliberate policy of disinformation entitled ‘Operation Mass 
Appeal’ (see BBC, 2003). 
 
Perhaps more importantly in terms of the legal requirement on current affairs programme 
makers to provide ‘impartial’, ‘balanced’ and factually correct information while ‘Bin 
Laden’s Biological Threat’ only dealt with the ‘threat’ from Iraq in part, no counter-
arguments were set forward to cast doubt on the link between Saddam’s regime and Al-
Qaida. In fact, Panorama episodes broadcast in 2003 did acknowledge such links to be 
improbable and pointed to possible splits over this issue between British and American 
governments, or at least disagreement over the evidence.  
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A Warning from Hollywood 
The third programme dealing with the 9-11 attacks was ‘September 11th: A Warning from 
Hollywood’ broadcast on the 24 March 2002 and presented by Steve Bradshaw. This 
programme followed up on the widely remarked sense, articulated by Zizek (see above) that 
the 9-11 attacks had been prefigured by a series of Hollywood action films. 
BRADSHAW:  The feeling that September 11th was like watching a movie was 
shared across the world, nowhere more strongly than in the hills above LA 
Harbour in Hollywood itself. 
 
STEVE DE SOUZA (Screenwriter - Die Hard  I & II) 
Well it did look like a movie.  It looked like a movie poster.  It looked like one of 
my movie posters. 
The investigation examines how Hollywood had been closer to predicting the 9-11 attacks 
than ‘any intelligence reports’.  
BRADSHAW:  For [former CIA case officer] Baer, the movies of the 90s had 
captured the threat from terrorism more accurately than his bosses in Washington. 
BAER:  The way I look at Hollywood is it has more imagination than the 
government.  The government is made up of bureaucrats. Hollywood takes the 
facts as they see them in life and turns them into these scenarios that are very 
close to reality in a certain sense.  The only difference between Hollywood and 
reality is Hollywood has a happy ending, and there's a hero. 
As Corbin’s report six months earlier made clear – intelligence reports did note plans by Al-
Qaida operatives to hijack jetliners on suicide missions and fly them into government 
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buildings. ‘September 11th: A Warning from Hollywood’ suggests that the problem lay with 
intelligence chiefs who did not heed warnings from their more junior advisors. Remarkably, 
one former member of the National Security Council argues that she became involved in the 
making of a Hollywood film as a way of her alerting the President to potential terrorist 
threats: 
 
JESSICA STERN (National Security Council, 1994-95) 
There was a group of us who felt that this was an urgent threat, that people  
weren't paying enough attention to.  Indeed we were determined to get the 
President to pay more attention to this issue. 
 
BRADSHAW:  Stern was approached by producers making a film called The 
Peacemaker about terrorists stealing an atomic bomb from Russia's ill-guarded 
stock pile, its so-called 'loose nukes.'  They wanted to turn Miss Stern into the 
lead character.  Stern agreed, believing a movie might have more impact on the 
White House than another memo. 
 
While details of how Jessica Stern was played by Nicole Kidman in The Peacemaker are 
interesting it could be argued that the more serious charge of why warnings from intelligence 
operatives following the 9-11 plotters were repeatedly ignored is not examined here or 
elsewhere in Panorama investigations. Neither was the wider issue of how US foreign policy, 
notably its support for Israel, sanctions against Iraq and perceived anti-Islamic bias had 
radicalised a generation of Arabs to the extent that terrorist attacks were almost inevitable 
(see McQueen, 2000; Hourani, 2002). Were those working on the three Panorama teams 
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covering 9-11 wary of raising these fundamental question due to fears of offending and losing 
the cooperation of senior intelligence, military and political figures? To the programme’s 
credit many of the details revealed in September 11
th
: A Warning from Hollywood are 
intriguing, such as the extent to which Hollywood films were based on the input and 
collaboration of the intelligence community or made with military support - conditional on 
script approval. There is also the extraordinary confirmation that Pentagon employed 
Hollywood script writers to brainstorm what the terrorists of Al-Qaeda might do next: 
 
BRADSHAW:  […]  At last the Pentagon seemed to be admitting it had to think 
more like Hollywood, and so the so-called 9-11 or September 11th Group was set 
up. 
 
The programme is visually powerful with aerial shots of American cities, tightly framed 
tracking shots of skyscrapers and menacing zooms on aircraft flying across urban landscapes. 
These cumulatively produce a paranoid atmosphere underscored by moody, threatening 
music which intersperses the various interviews. ‘September 11th: A Warning from 
Hollywood’ is a well made and, at times, thoughtful piece on how fictional representations of 
terrorist attacks were uncannily prescient of the 11 September atrocities. However, given the 
relatively limited number of Panorama investigations into the circumstances around the 
greatest security failure in America’s history, it represents another missed opportunity.  
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The Hunt for Bin Laden 
 
Ten months after the 9-11 attacks Panorama follows a group of American infantrymen as 
they locate and destroy Al-Qaida caves in Afghanistan in ‘The Hunt for Bin Laden’ . While 
not directly about the 9-11 attacks the film does assess progress in the ‘war on terror’ in 
Afghanistan. In her introduction Corbin explains how ‘Charlie Company have come 
thousands of miles to get even’. She interviews soldiers, asking them about their letters from 
wives and girlfriends so we get to know them as individuals. Corbin then sums up the 
objectives of the mission before going on to judge its effectiveness: 
 
CORBIN:  The men of C. Company are fighting in someone else's land to destroy 
a terror network that threatens the American dream.  I came to Bagram to witness 
a superpower turn its military might against a group of fanatics who'd hijacked a 
failed state – Afghanistan.  The base already bears the scars of the earlier ill-fated 
Soviet intervention.  I wanted to see who was winning this new kind of war to 
make the world a safer place after the September events that undermined all our 
certainties.   
 
Corbin does not appear to be quoting any politician when she states that the war is ‘to make 
the world a safer place’ and there is little historical perspective beyond a brief reference to the 
‘earlier ill-fated Soviet intervention’. A current affairs programme that takes a ‘longer view’ 
could have discussed, or at least mentioned, the three previous occupations of Afghanistan by 
British forces and how they ended ignominiously (see Bearden, 2001; Rashid, 2002). 
Nevertheless, the programme does show that all is not going well in the fight against Al 
Qaeda. It is revealed, for example, that Bin Laden and other Al Qaeda fighters slipped away 
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from Tora Bora with local Mujahedin help whilst US forces stood close by. It is also 
illustrates how effective the Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters could be in battle with US and 
British forces. Corbin certainly does not spare the blushes of a British marine brigadier who 
had arrived in the region with a confident fanfare: 
 
CORBIN:  The hapless brigadier found himself in the crossfire between Downing 
Street and the press, accused of having hyped expectations of what the marines 
would achieve. 
 
But how many Al Qaeda have you captured? 
 
Brigadier ROGER LANE (Commander, British Forces) 
We haven't captured any al Qaeda but I would… 
 
CORBIN:  And how many have you killed? [...] 
 
LANE:  We haven't killed any. 
 
What is noticeable looking back over Panorama investigations over a decade or more is an 
increasing use of non-diegetic sound effects and music as well as more ‘cinematic’ visual 
direction. Holland (2006) has explored the historic tension between the visual and the spoken 
word in current affairs television and the fear than journalistic values can be sacrificed if 
visual values are allowed to predominate. She argues that ‘television journalism gains its 
particular strengths from an interplay between the flow of images of varying power and 
intensity and the construction of verbal sense that plays against that imagery’ (2006: 93). 
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However, she also demonstrates that doubts and worries about the visual, particularly its 
emotive qualities can be shown to be justified. In The Hunt for Bin Laden there are several 
sequences that underscore these concerns. In one sequence we are taken through an exotic 
landscape of mountains and remote dusty tracks in which camels and goats are led by young 
herders. To the strains of a mournful, wailing music we are then positioned inside a cave in 
which torch lights appear to be shone from the entrance lighting up motes of dust. Foley 
sounds of dripping water echoing in the cave and a taught percussive drum effect as might be 
found in a thriller accompany the extended shot in which the torches are revealed to be small 
mirrors held by Afghan boys reflecting powerful rays of sunlight into the cave. One of these 
rays illuminates a dark area on the cave floor in which the face of Osama Bin Laden is 
superimposed, stretched and played in slow motion. The sequence is intercut with a grainy 
television image of President Bush and an interview with Senator Bob Graham in his office 
with the blinds drawn behind him:  
 
GRAHAM:  He's wealthy, he's charismatic and smart, and so by eliminating him 
you have dealt a crippling blow to al Qaeda. 
 
CORBIN:  So eliminating him must be the aim. 
 
GRAHAM:  He is the personification of al Qaeda and many people will not feel 
that there has been closure to this war unless he is brought to justice dead or alive. 
 
There is a strong suspicion in this sequence that such heavily worked images threaten 
Panorama’s claims to authentic reportage. The complicated studio reconstruction in ‘Bin 
Laden’s Biological Threat’ of a medieval plague doctor’s mask which metamorphizes into a 
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modern biological weapons mask intercut with a televised speech by Tony Blair projected on 
a screen in a laboratory, plays a similar, apparently innocent, illustrative role.  However, the 
concern here is that the emotive power of the images contains powerful ideological meanings 
that reinforce rather than challenge many of the assumptions upon which the ‘War on Terror’ 
was launched. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The popularity of many websites purporting to explain ‘the truth’ behind 9-11 suggests public 
interest in a proper investigation of the attacks was very high and remained so for many 
years. Yet Panorama failed to produce a series of detailed and far-reaching investigations 
that might have answered many of the fundamental questions raised by the events of 
September 2001. The reluctance of Panorama and other news and current affairs 
programmes to enquire beyond official narratives may have contributed to the circulation of  
persistent misconceptions, such as Iraqi links to Al-Qaeda, as well as the wilder and more 
ludicrous theories about 9-11 . Panorama did not challenge the US intelligence agencies’ 
record or properly assess the US government’s controversial policy prescriptions. Instead the 
BBC’s flagship current affairs series fell back on recycling old reports (‘The World’s Most 
Wanted’), exploring stale truisms about the analogies with Hollywood films (‘September 
11
th
: A Warning from Hollywood’) and broadcasting intelligence disinformation (‘Bin 
Laden’s Biological Threat’) that increased the likelihood of a war against Iraq. It also 
employed emotive visual imagery and audio soundscapes that were highly constructed and 
liable to reinforce and support the push for military solutions.   
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While aspects of these four programmes are valuable, taken as a whole, Panorama’s response 
to 9-11 did little to take those in power to account for their policy and security failings. The 
fact that Panorama’s Editor ordered an experienced reporter, Tom Mangold, who was on the 
spot, not to investigate the attacks, is symptomatic of a failure of nerve in Panorama’s 
coverage of 9-11. The BBC’s approach to current affairs, in this instance, can be 
characterised as timid and its reliance on official, ‘institutionally endowed’ sources (see 
McQueen 2008) hobbled the programme. In conclusion, unless the series is prepared to 
offend authority in its quest for answers to troubling and deep seated questions as it has done, 
on occasion, in previous decades (see McQueen 2010) then it is possible that the programme 
will be regarded as adding nothing significant to existing news coverage. For Panorama to 
overcome this threat of perceived irrelevance future investigations must ask the kind of 
awkward and discomforting questions that are mostly avoided in the programmes examined 
here. If it does not the programme may pass without mourning from the schedules. 
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